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Background: Many full-time Ugandan government health providers take on additional jobs – a phenomenon called
dual practice. We describe the complex patterns that characterize the evolution of dual practice in Uganda, and the
local management practices that emerged in response, in five government facilities. An in-depth understanding of dual
practice can contribute to policy discussions on improving public sector performance.
Methods: A multiple case study design with embedded units of analysis was supplemented by interviews with policy
stakeholders and a review of historical and policy documents. Five facility case studies captured the perspective of
doctors, nurses, and health managers through semi-structured in-depth interviews. A causal loop diagram illustrated
interactions and feedback between old and new actors, as well as emerging roles and relationships.
Results: The causal loop diagram illustrated how feedback related to dual practice policy developed in Uganda. As
opportunities for dual practice grew and the public health system declined over time, government providers
increasingly coped through dual practice. Over time, government restrictions to dual practice triggered policy
resistance and protest from government providers. Resulting feedback contributed to compromising the supply of
government providers and, potentially, of service delivery outcomes. Informal government policies and restrictions
replaced the formal restrictions identified in the early phases. In some instances, government health managers,
particularly those in hospitals, developed their own practices to cope with dual practice and to maintain public
sector performance. Management practices varied according to the health manager’s attitude towards dual practice and
personal experience with dual practice. These practices were distinct in hospitals. Hospitals faced challenges managing
internal dual practice opportunities, such as those created by externally-funded research projects based within the
hospital. Private wings’ inefficiencies and strict fee schedule made them undesirable work locations for providers.
Conclusions: Dual practice prevails because public and private sector incentives, non-financial and financial, are
complementary. Local management practices for dual practice have not been previously documented and provide
learning opportunities to inform policy discussions. Understanding how dual practice evolves and how it is managed
locally is essential for health workforce policy, planning, and performance discussions in Uganda and similar settings.Introduction
Dual practice, when health workers employed full time
by the government take on additional jobs, is widespread
in developing countries, particularly those with growing
private sectors. Recent studies found that 29% of physicians
in Cote d’Ivoire, 35% of physicians in Vietnam, 42% in
Sri Lanka and 41% in Zimbabwe, , and as high as 80% in* Correspondence: LPAINA@jhu.edu
1Department of International Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health, 615 N. Wolfe St., Suite E8541, Baltimore, MD 21205, USA
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2014 Paina et al.; licensee BioMed Central L
Commons Attribution License (http://creativec
reproduction in any medium, provided the or
Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.or
unless otherwise stated.Indonesia and Bangladesh, held second jobs [1-5]. In
some contexts, dual practice can be broader than private
for-profit sector service delivery – including both research
and NGO work. Researchers and policy-makers in devel-
oping countries display increasing interest in how dual
practice affects the health system [6,7].
Uganda is one of these countries. The country has a
vibrant private health sector. Within this, the private
not-for-profit health sector has, for decades, been acting
as an extension of the public one, especially after the
public health sector was mostly destroyed during thetd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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Uganda’s private for-profit sector is large, fragmented, and
disorganized, yet very little is known about it. Although
there are growing discussions about public-private part-
nerships in health [8], dual practice seldom features on
these agendas and data on this topic is scarce. In Uganda,
in 2005, a nationally representative survey of private
health facilities found that more than half (54%) of private
sector doctors also declared being formally employed in
the public sector [9]. While estimates from public facilities
do not exist, in general, health providers and policy-
makers perceive that almost all government-employed
health workers have dual practice. In addition, dual prac-
tice has been rising in importance on the policy agenda
due to media reports of adverse health service delivery
outcomes [10,11], as well as suspected linkages to absen-
teeism and the wastage linked to it [12,13]. A recent study
aiming to establish policy-makers’ research priorities re-
vealed that a principal concern was dual practice that
was “reported to greatly affect the performance of the
public sector. The dual [practice] of public health
workers has implications on quality and management of
health care delivery such as indiscipline, time loss and
poor work ethics” [7].
Despite these concerns, data on dual practice in
Uganda and elsewhere is scarce. Although many types of
health providers are believed to engage in dual practice,
the available literature examines dual practice rather
narrowly, generally only from the perspective of physicians.
Furthermore, existing studies provide few answers to
questions related to the policy and management of dual
practice, beyond agreement that the effects of dual prac-
tice on the organization of the health system and service
delivery can be either positive or negative, and that these
effects, and related policy responses, are highly dependent
on the local context [14-16]. For example, if well managed,
dual practice may help prevent doctors from leaving the
country by enabling them to supplement salaries without
adversely affecting stock of doctors in the country. Con-
versely, if poorly managed, absenteeism and pilfering may
negatively affect public sector standards of care and con-
tribute to inefficiencies. The factors and interactions that
drive these effects have not been explored extensively.
Presumably, these factors depend on how dual practice
has evolved and how it is managed in a particular health
system.
Studying the dynamic aspects of dual practice and re-
lated interactions both within and outside the boundaries
of a health system requires a departure from the linear,
theoretical models found in the literature [2,17-20]. A
more appropriate model acknowledges the holistic, com-
plex, and adaptive nature of health systems and their
broader environment. Complex systems are composed of
many interacting components that organize themselves indynamic ways, are unpredictable in the long-term, and are
able to learn from past experiences [21-23]. A research
design acknowledging complex systems’ features, as well
as potential interactions due to contextual factors, is ideal
to guide the exploration of phenomena, such as dual
practice, from multiple perspectives. It facilitates the
exploration of complex system characteristics, such as
feedback, emergence, and self-organization. In this paper,
we explore how dual practice evolved in the Ugandan
health system and how it is currently managed, in an
urban environment – the city of Kampala, with an active
private sector. Additionally, using systems approaches, we
attempt to reflect on why dual practice persists and the
factors underlying its current management. Understanding
dual practice holistically in the Ugandan context provides
a basis for exploring potential policy options. Gaining an
in-depth understanding of the role of dual practice at vari-
ous levels of the system can help policy-makers and health




We use case studies of urban public health facilities to
investigate the role of dual practice and the key patterns
and interactions that it motivated in the health system.
Review of policy documents, as well as qualitative inter-
views of policy stakeholders were used to supplement a
qualitative survey of workers and their managers in the
study facilities. In addition, during the data analysis phase,
we developed a causal loop diagram to illustrate key fac-
tors and related feedback influencing dual practice in the
current context. This paper presents only a sub-set of data
that were collected as part of a sequential, exploratory
mixed methods study.
We purposefully selected five public sector health facil-
ities in Kampala, Uganda, to represent the various levels
in the Ugandan government health system: two Health
Center III facilities, one Health Center IV facility, and
two urban hospitals (see Table 1 for case characteristics).
Health Center III facilities have a general outpatient clinic
and a maternity ward. Health Center IV is a larger facility
than the Health Center III facilities, with the capacity for
inpatient services and some emergency operations. Re-
gional referral hospitals have specialized clinics, and are
staffed by a variety of cadres, including medical specialists.
The national referral hospital also has research and teach-
ing components, in addition to medical service provision.
Within these case studies, individual respondents were
purposefully selected to ensure that, at each facility, the
perspectives of providers (doctors and nurses) and the
facility manager, were captured [24]. At each facility, the
sample included the health facility manager (in-charge in
health centers, directors or department heads at hospitals),
Table 1 Summary of selected cases
Facility type Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E
Health Center III* X X
Health Center IV X
Hospital X X
Location
Central X X X
Periphery X X
Staff composition
General practitioners X X X
Specialists X X
Nurses X X X X X
Filled positions 121% 74% 90% 144% 90%
Source: Ministry of Health – Human resources for health audit [25].
*Note: Health Center III units are supposed to be staffed by Clinical Officers
and Nurses – although sometimes units do have a Medical officer as well.
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facility manager. Within the larger hospital, the sampling
occurred at the level of the clinical specialty [1], and there-
fore included multiple manager-level respondents, as well
as a nurse and a doctor recommended by each of them.
Within the smaller hospital, the sample included the dir-
ector and two providers recommended by them.
Policy stakeholders included purposefully selected indi-
viduals from professional councils, relevant government
ministries, private not-for-profit medical bureaus, private
sector hospital administration, and the local district health
office. The main criteria guiding the sampling was the
extent to which a stakeholder would know policies on
dual practice either at the national level or within their
organization, would have a stake in the development of a
policy on dual practice, and present a unique perspective
on dual practice in the Ugandan context.
Data collection instruments and field work
A review of policy documents was undertaken before the
data collection, and as these documents became available.
The main areas of interest were the existence and content
of policies, actors, and events that played a role in the evo-
lution of dual practice in Uganda, as far back in time as
possible.
The interview guides contained questions about the evo-
lution of dual practice in Uganda, providers’ motivation to
engage in dual practice, advantages and disadvantages or
challenges linked to dual practice, facility-level policies
and management approaches, and potential policy recom-
mendations. Interviews with policy stakeholders focused
on policy-related questions, as well as on the evolution of
dual practice in the health system. Data collection took
place during July–August 2012. The interviews were
conducted in English. Interviews were recorded, unless
respondents preferred otherwise.Data analysis
All of the recordings were transcribed and stored in Atlas.
ti v. 7. A preliminary, exploratory coding structure was
constructed based on initial readings of the transcripts
and on the conceptual framework derived from a systems
approach to health markets and theories related to sys-
tems thinking and health worker motivation [21-23,26,27].
Multiple rounds of coding focused on refining the scheme
[28]. During coding and analysis, memos were devel-
oped to capture changes in the coding structure, as well
as emerging reflections.
Text query results from Atlas.ti were arranged in matri-
ces for within and cross-case analyses, according to the
methods suggested by Miles and Huberman [24]. For each
case, matrices were developed by theme (e.g., informal
organizational policies), with focus on the embedded units
of analysis (e.g., summarizing and contrasting the per-
spectives of health facility managers, doctors, and nurses).
Cross-case theme analyses focused on exploring the differ-
ences and similarities between the five cases, specifically
by health facility type. The policy stakeholder interviews
were analyzed for emerging themes, along the same lines
as the case studies. References to the analysis and any
quotes are labeled according to respondent type, to main-
tain anonymity.
Causal loop diagram development
Although it was not an explicit goal of this study, inter-
views with policy-makers revealed that the role of dual
practice and the government policy on dual practice chan-
ged over time, and that examining this progression might
be useful for understanding the current policy situation.
Based on discussions with policy-makers and case study
respondents, as well as available historical accounts, we
developed a causal loop diagram (CLD). The CLD illus-
trates the events, actors, and interactions – or the under-
lying mental model and system behavior – that fostered
the emergence of dual practice policy responses over time
in the Ugandan health system, facilitating the visualization
of complex system patterns and characteristics, such as
policy resistance, feedback, and adaptation [29,30].
The CLD was developed using Vensim PLE Plus [31].
It was challenging to recreate the history of dual prac-
tice, particularly in the distant past. An account of the
medical profession in East Africa, which included de-
tails about the emergence and development of dual
practice and the private sector from the perspective of
physicians, helped to identify relevant early events
from the 1960s and the 1970s [32]. Recent events have
been identified from the in-depth interviews conducted
for this study and available documents. The CLD was
refined through various iterations, to ensure that the
relationships, interactions, and direction of feedback
were most plausible.
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from variable A to variable B means that A adds to B, or,
a change in A causes a change in B in the same direction;
a negative (−) arrow from A to B means that A subtracts
from B, or, a change in A causes a change in B in the
opposite direction” [33]. Some of the relationships create
feedback loops. These loops are reinforcing if the vari-
ables influence each other in the same direction. Loops
are balancing if they influence each other in different
directions. The thickness of the line denotes researcher’s
emphasis on a relationship, for illustrative purposes.
Dashed arrows highlight key, probable relationships
identified through this study. The question mark (?) indi-
cates an unknown relationship. This is not the recom-
mended notation, as it is preferred to make explicit the
“multiple causal pathways connecting the two variables”
[33]. However, data currently do not exist to sufficiently
tease out how dual practice affects service delivery. For
example, while we know that dual practice can affect
systems positively and negatively, whether and how much
dual practice contributes to adverse service delivery out-
comes is unknown.Ethical approvals
Ethical approvals were obtained from the Institutional
Review Board of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School
of Public Health (IRB No. 4371), the Makerere University
College of Health Sciences – School of Public Health
Higher Degrees, Research, and Ethics Committee (IRB
No. 11353), the Mulago Research Ethics Committee
(Protocol no. 249), and the Uganda National Council
for Science and Technology (Ref. No. SS 2883).Results
Twenty-three interviews with doctors, nurses, and health
managers from various types of facilities, as well as 13
policy-stakeholder interviews were conducted. None of
the respondents approached for an interview declined to
speak to us, although a few preferred that our interview
not be recorded. Respondent characteristics are displayed
in Table 2. About half of our health facility respondents
reported having dual practice at the time of the interview,
or having been previously been involved in private sector
work.
The CLDs that follow display the factors associated
with the presence of dual practice in the system and the
emergence of current management practices and policies.
They illustrate three phases to describe the emergence of
dual practice in Uganda: pre-independence through the
1960s, 1970s through the 1980s, and the 1990’s through
the present. Table 3 complements the CLDs by illustrating
a timeline of critical events that affected the policy and
management of dual practice.The remainder of this section first describes, in each
phase, the feedback and interactions that emerged in rela-
tion to government policies on dual practice, as well as,
more broadly, the development of a mixed health system
in Uganda. It concludes by describing how dual practice is
currently managed in the government facilities included
in this study.
Phase 1: Dual practice policy before Uganda’s
independence and through the 1960s
Figure 1 illustrates a relatively simple system, showing
no feedback or unintended consequences, where a nascent
private sector does not initially provide sufficient incen-
tives for providers to engage in dual practice.
During this time, government restrictions on dual prac-
tice are formal – written and enforced: dual practice is
allowed only after government hours. Some dual practice
opportunities exist, however, demand is low due to high
satisfaction with the government benefits. Few government
providers chose to engage in dual practice, generally
seeking the autonomy provided by private practice. No
evidence was found that dual practice raised concerns
about adverse health service delivery outcomes. Even as re-
strictions on dual practice became stronger after Uganda’s
independence, the Ugandan government was able to pro-
vide government health workers with sufficient financial
and non-financial incentives (e.g., satisfactory wages and
the prestige of working in a government institution, re-
spectively). One of the policy-stakeholder respondents
confirms the general sentiment in this period [32]:
“The assumption was, that what the government pays
can cater for what you require in real life. […] in the
60’s, a medical officer, medical assistant, the nurse,
was capable of catering for everything they required,
the basics of life [with the government salary alone].
And they were held with high esteem, they were very
ethical. I mean a medical officer would walk with his
head high.” – Ministry of Health policy stakeholder
Phase 2: Dual practice policy in the 1970s and 1980s
Figure 2, illustrates a second phase, during which the
Ugandan system undergoes instability of military rule and,
eventually, civil war.
During this period, instability affects the health workforce
in multiple ways: through reduced infrastructure and
government budgets, as well as through persecution of
health providers for political reasons. These country-level
hardships are intensified by the broader global recession.
The multiple crises cripple the government health system,
and mark the beginning of several decades of low govern-
ment salaries. While the job security and prestige related
to government service are still important, the government
financial incentives are no longer sufficient for providers
Table 2 Interview respondent characteristics
Facility-based respondents
Case A Case B Case C Case D1 Case E Nr. (%)
Gender Male 0 1 1 2 4 8 (35%)
Female 3 2 2 1 7 15 (65%)
Yrs. in service <10 1 1 1 0 0 3 (13%)
10–19 0 1 1 0 5 7 (30%)
20–29 2 0 1 1 2 6 (26%)
30+ 0 1 0 2 3 6 (26%)
Profession Nurse 2 2 2 1 2 9 (39%)
General practitioner 0 1 1 0 0 2 (9%)
Clinical officer 1 0 0 0 0 1 (4%)
Specialist 0 0 0 2 9 11 (48%)
Dual practice Yes 10 (43%)
TOTAL 23
Policy stakeholders
Gender Male 12 (92%)
Female 1 (8%)
Sector Public/government 5 (38%)
Professional associations 4 (31%)
Private for-profit 3 (23%)
Private not-for-profit 1 (8%)
TOTAL 13
1Years in service not available for one of the respondents at this facility.
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resign at this time, or leave the country. Increasingly,
government providers who remain in the system seek
additional income through dual practice. The same policy
stakeholder explained:
“[With] the economic downturn of the 70s, then the wars
that have been associated with [Amin and Obote’s]
regime, the salary did not have any meaning anymore.
[…] The global economy has changed, impacting
everyone, […] the country, with all the hardships it’s
had – the economy has not been able to cope with the
many social needs. That’s why salaries across all public
servants have remained very low and therefore public
servants have to look for alternative survival
mechanisms.” – Ministry of Health policy stakeholder
As the public sector increasingly suffers and govern-
ment providers “look for alternative survival mechanisms”,
this period leads to the first large-scale development of
the private sector, after Asians (including doctors) were
expelled from Uganda for political reasons, many of the
Ugandan government doctors who remained in the country
re-opened the former Asian private practices and many of
them were perceived to have dual practice. At this time, theincreasing concerns about the quality of services provided
in private for-profit medical practices (while not proven to
be linked to adverse health and health system outcomes),
contributes to suspicion around dual practice, specifically
related to potential damage to the quality of services in the
public sector and pilfering of government medical supplies.
Consequently, the government begins imposing strong,
formal restrictions on dual practice, a strict ban on dual
practice and, at one point in 1972, closes all private clinics.
As shown in Figure 3, these strong, formal restrictions to
dual practice trigger provider protests and resignation,
and contribute to provider migration, both of which com-
promise the supply of government health providers. Inter-
national sanctions on the military government and a
declining economy made salaries of civil savants unattract-
ive. Increasing protests and advocacy from professional
associations eventually lead to the government relaxing
restrictions. Weaker restrictions, which allowed dual prac-
tice after government hours, reduced the threat to govern-
ment providers and diminished the undesirable feedback.
During the 1980s, the global debt crisis and the sub-
sequent structural adjustment program fuelled the
development of the private sector, while, at the same
time, constraining government budgets [34]. In this con-
text, the financial benefits of working in private practice
Table 3 A timeline of critical events and government policy on dual practice
Year Event Dual practice policy Consequences
Pre- Nr. of African health professionals
growing
Weak formal govt. restrictions: dual
practice allowed after govt. hours
None
1962 Ugandan independence
Post-1962 Govt. suspicions about private
sector growing




Transition to military rule and
civil war
1972 Asian doctors expulsed After 1970’s events, restrictions
to dual practice contributed to
resignations from government
services and provider migration –
therefore reducing the number
of govt. providers
… Ugandan doctors take over
private practices
1974 Government shuts down
private practices
… Provider protest advocacy to
allow dual practice
Late 1970’s Broadly, international sanctions
on military government led to
economic collapse and decline
in government salaries relative
to cost of living
Weak formal govt. restrictions: dual
practice allowed after govt. hours
Dual practice is a coping
mechanism for providers
remaining in Uganda
Government changes policy on
dual practice as incentive for
govt. providers
1980’s Govt. suspicions about dual
practice and private sector
strengthen
Weak, formal govt. restrictions: dual
practice not allowed
1990’s
2000’s Rapid private sector growth,
especially after system recovered
from civil war, creates increasing
nr. of dual practice opportunities
No formal govt. restrictions
… Informal govt. restrictions on dual
practice, with weak influence
2005–2007 MOH tests ban on dual practice
in few hospitals
Providers threaten to resign
2009–2010 Office of President establishes
Medicines and Health Service
Delivery Monitoring Unit
Dual practice important coping
mechanism
Increasing nr. of policy discussions
around dual practice, absenteeism,
ghost workers
Providers threaten to resign in
response to discussions of ban
Increasing concerns about the
contribution of dual practice
to decreases in quality and
access to care in both public
and private sectors
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vated government providers to engage in dual practice.
Government restrictions remain formal, but weak, at this
time. Based on the available information, we propose that
during this eventful and tumultuous period, dual practice
and the incentives related to practicing in the private
sector complement incentives for government service.
Moreover, restrictions on dual practice without any fur-
ther measures to address the government health system
contribute to a decrease in the number of government
providers. The dashed lines in Figure 2 highlight these
proposed influences.Phase 3: Dual practice policy from the 1990s to the
present
Figure 4 illustrates the changes in the system from the
1990s to the present: the private sector grows significantly
as Uganda recovers from civil war and privatization is en-
couraged through the structural adjustment program [34]
and well-financed vertical health projects and clinical re-
search initiatives.
Dual practice opportunities grow quickly in a context
of rapid private sector growth, as well as of increasing
donor-funded research and NGO projects, generally housed
within public facilities. Due to an ever constrained budget
Figure 1 Causal loop diagram illustrating factors influencing dual practice from pre-independence through the 1960’s. The causal loop
illustrates the first period of interest: a simple system with little demand for dual practice. It is important to highlight that no feedback loops were
identified in this phase.
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system cannot offer providers an alternative to dual
practice. Private practice during this period promises
significant financial incentives, particularly in contrast
to low government salaries, but lacks the job securityFigure 2 Causal loop diagram illustrating factors influencing dual pra
second period of interest: the health system is challenged by broader cont
demand for dual practice grows, so do opportunities for government prov
adverse effects and, at first, imposes a ban on dual practice. A balancing lo
further details).and prestige that are still associated with government
practice. The increasing population demand, as well as the
significant earnings possible through private practice, make
dual practice a frequent coping mechanism for government
providers. In the absence of formal rules to manage dualctice during the 1970’s and 1980’s. The causal loop illustrates the
extual events – such as the civil war and the global debt crisis. As
iders. The government becomes increasingly suspicious of potential
op first results in unintended negative consequences (See Figure 3 for
Figure 3 Focusing on the restrictions loop. Starting with the 1970’s, strong restrictions to dual practice trigger unintended consequences
through a balancing feedback loop – a decrease in the number of government providers. Subsequently, successful advocacy efforts to ease
restrictions eventually dampen their effects on the broader health workforce, although restrictions remain in place they are acceptable to the
provider population. This figure re-draws the CLD diagram to better illustrate the factors influencing these unintended consequences.
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and informal practices for mitigating detrimental effects
of dual practice, such as absenteeism, while retaining the
government health workforce, despite low salaries and
poor infrastructure.
The absence of a formal policy on dual practice was
confirmed by interview participants and also by our re-
view of Ministry of Health and Ministry of Public Service
policy documents. As our respondents illustrate below,
current government restrictions are informal – unwritten,
not enforced, and based on expectations of provider be-
havior in the public sector.
“I don’t think there is a clear policy saying that there
is no dual practice […] we are expected NOT to do it
[…]. [Health workers] know what’s supposed to be the
normal, but are kind of forced to do it, as I’ve said, to
improve a bit on their earnings. […] We don’t come
out to fight it. I can’t tell someone please don’t go the
other end, because there’s a reason that is pulling this
person to go, and I have no control over that. All I can
do is to make sure enforcing that this person is here
with me at the right time, for 7 or 8 hours. So we can’tinfluence what happens beyond that […] I cannot
influence the earnings. […] The person has the needs,
and I can’t satisfy the needs in any other way […] I
can’t provide alternatives.” – Government official 1“A lot of policies are implemented while they are just
known by the policy-makers but they are not written
down. So, we know about dual practice and the policy
is that […] it should be left as it is. That people can be
allowed to do dual practice. […] It is not written. It’s
not written at all, but they should not take too much
of public time to do it. […] Unfortunately, there is no
mechanism to enforce how much public time people
are going to take because […] a lot of things that have
gone wrong, including this dual practice, have gone
wrong because of poor regulatory systems.” –
Government official 2
Interviews with policy stakeholders revealed that the
government initiated periodic attempts to formalize
government restrictions on dual practice, motivated by
suspicion around dual practice due to media coverage
of adverse health outcomes and poor public sector
Figure 4 Causal loop diagram illustrating factors influencing dual practice during the 1990’s to the present. Dual practice opportunities
grow exponentially, as it becomes more attractive to government providers working in an underfunded and over-burdened public system. A
formal, written government policy does not exist. Local facility-level coping mechanisms emerge to mitigate negative consequences of dual
practice on the health system. Periodic threats for increasing restrictions re-activate the feedback loop presented in Figure 3.
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gered in the context of budget discussions, media reports
about ghost workers, and increased concerns about qual-
ity of care in both public and private sectors as indicated
by adverse health service delivery outcomes linked to
absenteeism, pilfering of drugs, and patient deaths in the
private sector from suspected malpractice.
Escalating policy discussions around formalizing re-
strictions on dual practice are often met with provider
protests, triggering the feedback displayed in Figure 3
and the government goes back to “keeping quiet”, in this
case meaning informal restrictions. A couple of the policy
stakeholders provides examples of such events, which also
illustrate that the government increasingly recognizes the
role of dual practice in the system, particularly in the
absence of changing government pay.
~2005–2007: “The [high level official] gave a directive
that it should stop. […] He said: ‘Officer, we are going
to work out the methodology of implementing it […]
But we shall not do it broadly across the country, we
shall test it in some hospitals.’ So we came [to one of
the hospitals], and communicated what the [high level
official] had done, and said, these people [at this
hospital] said: ‘We hear you loud and clear, but let’s
agree if I cannot take that prescription, am I free to
leave the government job? So that I can go to the other
side [meaning private practice]? […] we either stay or
go? Is that what you’re trying to communicate to us?’
We said: ‘Yes’. Within two days […] the [hospital]director came rushing to the headquarters to say:
‘Guys, stop talking about dual practice because
everybody is winding up to go.’ So, the [government
official] went back and told the [high level official]:
‘We tried to test it in [a hospital] and all the
consultants are not bothered - they want to leave
[this hospital].’ - and dual practice has gone on.” –
Ministry of Health policy stakeholder 1
In response to the cycles of uncertainty related to in-
formal government restrictions to dual practice, as well
as to coping with potential negative consequences of dual
practice on public sector performance, we found that
local, facility-level and department-level management
practices can develop in government facilities. Facility
management practices arise in response to increasing
number of government providers with dual practice and
aim to reduce any adverse service delivery outcomes in
the public sector. As long as dual practice remains an
incentive for providers to remain in government service
(and sufficient resources to incentivize providers other-
wise do not exist), these facility management practices
could potentially weaken any policy restrictions to dual
practice and any related negative effects on the govern-
ment workforce.
Local management practices for dual practice
Data from the case studies revealed that, in the absence
of a formal, written policy on dual practice, health man-
agers develop their own approaches to coping with and
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marizes the approaches identified through this study.
These facility-level management practices encourage the
presence and performance of their staff during govern-
ment hours although these codes of practice are generally
unwritten. For example, no respondents described dual
practice being addressed directly during regular staff
meetings. Instead, respondents described informal, one-
on-one consultations: health managers intervening with
providers in private, often in response to an issue related
to provider performance.
In one case, a health manager fostered a culture of
flexible scheduling, i.e., all senior doctors get one day or
certain afternoons to dedicate to their other activities,
whether research or dual practice, in exchange for reporting
to duty on other days. According to the unit’s manager:
“We tried to create a bit of flexibility and say, ok, all
of us must be on station in the morning, and let’s take
turns to cover the evening. And may be trying to bring
the evening time a bit forward to, to allow people to
earn some extra earning. […] When I see the outputs,
then I don’t complain. Yes, and sometimes they come
and start early, before 8 o’clock and if someone is here
by 7 and even comes back on the weekend to clear if
there is any backlog, I think, really, I can only say
thank you because I can’t pay them more than they
earn.” – Case E, Health manager
This particular arrangement was not only facilitated by
the fact that the unit manager was understanding of the
reasons why providers would engage in dual practice
and had an output-oriented supervision style, but also
by the fact that the majority of doctors working in this
unit worked in the same private health facility, which
was close to their government location.
Within the larger facilities, formal policies included,
for example, having a private wing, where doctors and
nurses could see and get paid for private patients under
the auspices of the government facility, or limiting nurses’
night duties so as to deter them from taking up full-time
dual practice during the day.
Most of the health managers interviewed had a generally
favorable attitude towards dual practice, not discouraging
it within their facility. Their attitude stemmed from their
own personal experiences where, in the past, they also had
no choice but to take on additional jobs to compensate for
government sector shortcomings. It also stemmed from
broader frustration at not being able to enforce attendance
policies and not having the necessary tools to adequately
monitor health workers (an exception was the health
manager for Case C, who expressed high confidence in
public accountability). The principal tool available to
managers for holding health workers accountable wereattendance registers, which could be easily falsified. In
this context, dual practice was generally tolerated
within government facilities. Health managers empha-
sized the need to prioritize the completion of govern-
ment duties and, to the extent possible, tried to
introduce incentives for improved performance in the
public sector.
“I don’t stop anybody from doing that. What […] I tell
them is that: priority is a core job and your core job is
the public service. Once you do my work well, then I
don’t mind about what you do next.” – Case D,
Nurse/Health Manager
These management approaches, generally lenient with
respect to dual practice, seemed to mitigate providers’
exit from the government health workforce. Additionally,
they also seemed to tackle broader issues of provider per-
formance, such as absenteeism. In Case B, providers
reported being able to manage their two jobs without con-
flict. One of the providers reported seeing dual practice as
a privilege: “if you want to reward yourself by doing an
extra job, you have to make sure we [in the government
sector] are covered” (Case B, doctor). Nevertheless, because
of the broader health system issues, where managers lack
tools to properly enforce policies in general, approaches to
manage dual practice also had shortfalls. For example, in
Case C, the in-charge reported that providers who were
found with multiple jobs (often caught in the private fa-
cilities), were asked to quit them in favor of government
service. While this manager reported confidence in this
approach, the other respondents from the facility reported
that almost everyone in the facility engaged in dual prac-
tice, but this was not discussed with the manager. Some of
these approaches also created tensions among staff. The
flexible scheduling mentioned earlier was not available to
non-physicians and therefore friction arose from time to
time among work teams. The private wing is one of the
dual practice policy interventions listed in the literature
[15], however, in the study context, it was perceived to be
inefficient, and the infrastructure only marginally better
than the rest of the facility.
Discussion
This paper is one of the few contributing empirical evi-
dence on dual practice policy and management prac-
tices in Uganda and low- and middle-income countries,
more broadly. It illustrates how dual practice policies
changed over time in the Ugandan system and how this
phenomenon is currently managed within a sample of
government facilities. It also attempts to use the existing
data to reflect on and to explain why dual practice persists
and the current approaches that have developed in the
study context.
Table 4 Facility-level management practices for dual practice, by case








Effect on the supply of government providers
Case A Dual practice allowed after government
duties completed
Negative Yes No No Associated misunderstandings potentially create
feedback that decreases the supply of government
providers. Providers interviewed had a different
interpretation of the in-charge’s version of
“completeness,” and reported leaving government
work early. The misunderstandings associated with
this approach were perceived to result in absenteeism
Case B Motivate providers to perform at their
public sector job (e.g., supportive





Cautious Yes No Yes Potentially promotes desirable feedback, by creating
conditions to improve public sector performance
and retain government providers
Case C Discourage dual practice; emphasize
priority for government duties and high
public sector performance
Negative Yes No No Potentially promotes undesirable feedback by
reducing the number of government providers;
alternatively threats of disciplinary action could
support improved performance in public sector
Case D Priority for government duties;
non-interference with time
outside government duties
Positive Yes No No Potentially does not affect government supply of
doctors, but creates tensions among staff
Although the Case D – the smaller hospital’s
leadership had a positive attitude towards dual
practice, they did not report a specific management
strategy, except non-interference. Doctors reported
to cope with dual practice through individual
negotiations among their colleagues; however, this
was not without pitfalls, as nurses were perceived to
compensate for the absence of doctors. Furthermore,
doctors appeared to have difficulty responding to
emergencies, given that they juggled two or
sometimes more places of work
Case E Formal policies Mixed, depends Yes No Yes, in the context of flexible
scheduling; N/A for other
policies and practices
Potentially effective at reducing the number of nurses
working two full time jobs. According to respondents,
also improved attendance among nurses. Probably no
effect on those with part-time dual practice
Policy preventing nurses to sign up for
only night duties (which typically means
they have a full-time day job)
A memorandum of understanding with
externally funded research projects, to
stop the active recruitment of government
staff to fill full-time positions on projects
Effective at reducing active recruitment by research
and NGO projects, therefore reducing internal dual
practice opportunities. According to respondents,
also improved attendance among nurses
Private wing Ineffective – mild effect on government providers,
but has potential if more efficient.
Informal policies Sustains retention among government providers,
particularly specialists. Flexible scheduling creates
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feedback, and learning, dual practice has become an
informal, yet integral component of a government health
workers’ incentive package. This package has also evolved
over time to one where job security and prestige remain
important, but no longer sufficient due to some of the
lowest salaries in the region, poor system infrastructure,
and increasing patient loads. In a situation where the
government cannot offer financial or non-financial al-
ternatives to substitute dual practice (i.e., improve the
incentives for sole public practice), the official policy for
dual practice shifted from formal restrictions to one
based on informal expectations. Any attempts to formalize
restrictions is met with unintended consequences due to
policy resistance and emerging feedback, threatening the
stability of government health workforce more broadly.
Our data confirmed the existence of self-organization
through local, facility-level management practice, which
allow health managers and providers to cope with working
in both the public and private sectors. The purpose of
these practices was not necessarily to curb dual practice,
but to maintain performance of the public sector by
ensuring the presence of providers and, at the same
time, to achieve an optimum balance between government
workers’ public and private activities and needs. Some
of these management practices were easy to identify and
describe, e.g., the ones guided by a health manager, as in
the example of the hospital department. Other manage-
ment practices, based on individual negotiations, presum-
ably depended on internal provider networks, whose
development, and also decline, could not be captured
through our study methods. Most frequently, health
managers found opportunities to intervene as common
symptoms of dual practice that threaten public sector
performance, such as absenteeism, triggered concerns.
These management practices could potentially minimize
destabilizing effects occasionally arising from the policy
feedback and resistance.
Our exploration revealed two issues that are relevant
beyond the issue of dual practice policy and management
and perhaps also beyond the Ugandan context. First of all,
public sector performance management emerged as an
area with significant shortfalls. In the absence of tools and
support for rewarding good performance and punishing
poor performance, the tacit, indirect approach to man-
aging dual practice does not sufficiently empower health
managers to supervise and enforce boundaries for govern-
ment employees, who must fulfill their duties in both the
public and private sectors. Also, because the nature of
dual practice differs among nurses, general practitioners,
and specialists, cadre-specific management approaches
and tools might be appropriate.
Second, the nature of the Ugandan health system, and
that of many sub-Saharan African countries, is verydifferent than it was immediately after independence.
Initially designed around the public sector, the private
sector and particularly the private for-profit components,
have been treated with suspicion and not integrated
within a broader vision for the health system. Presently,
the pluralist health systems that dominate low- and
middle-income countries cannot be ignored. As a ma-
jority of the population, including the poor, relies on the
private for-profit sector, increasing government stew-
ardship is necessary to maintain the highest standards
of service delivery [35]. In this context, providers engaged
in dual practice could serve as a channel for reaching the
private for-profit sector and the synergies between govern-
ment practice and private for-profit practice must be
recognized.
How dual practice actually affects the health system
and service delivery remains one of the key unknowns.
While the literature and study respondents acknowledged
both positive and negative effects of dual practice, in
most low- and middle-income contexts, Uganda included,
actual effects on the health system are unknown. Further-
more, issues such as shortfalls in quality of care, absentee-
ism, and efficiency gaps in public spending have broader
root causes and can only partly be attributed to dual prac-
tice. A better understanding of the dual practice effects on
providers, health facilities, and the broad health system
would help governments to better calibrate their policy
approach and to explore options for reaching a better
balance between public and private sector spheres in
health care.
Strengths and limitations
This study represents one of the few exploring dual
practice holistically, from multiple perspectives (doctors,
nurses, managers, policy stakeholders), and by applying
systems thinking tools, such as the CLD. Only a few
examples of CLDs exist in health research [36-39]. The
researchers established credibility and confirmability of
the findings by triangulating the data from the interviews
across multiple types of providers, and, where possible,
through the document and policy review.
The conclusions are constrained by several limitations.
Much of the early history of dual practice in Uganda relies
on a single source and it was not possible to verify the
events or written government documents we mention. Be-
cause the case studies were based in a large urban center,
generalizations to rural Uganda, where the opportunities
for private practice are substantially different, are not
possible. We could not explore dual practice in private
not-for-profit or for-profit facilities or include additional
cadres believed to engage in dual practice (e.g., clinical
officers). The large hospital was much more complex than
the other cases included in our study, and perhaps deserved
to be studied in greater depth. Although the information
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data sources, it could not be validated with study respon-
dents as it was developed after the data collection ended.
Future research into how dual practice is managed
by public facilities and how private for-profit facilities
incentivize and contract with their providers, would be
helpful. More in-depth studies looking at dual practice
from the perspective of other cadres, such as clinical
officers, or of rural practitioners could provide additional
insights into this phenomenon. The facility-level manage-
ment mechanisms described here could inspire formal
policies aimed at minimizing the negative consequences
of dual practice, while helping to seize opportunities for
public-private sector synergies. The effects of dual practice
on service delivery outcomes, such as quality of services
and access to care, have not been established in the litera-
ture, although there is consensus that dual practice likely
contributes both positively and negatively. Validating the
CLD and translating it into a system dynamics model
could be relevant in policy discussions as a platform for
testing various policy scenarios and anticipating unin-
tended feedback in the system.
Policy relevance
The unintended feedback revealed through the CLD, at
times detrimental to the public health sector, confirms the
recommendations of previous studies, which proposed
that a ban on dual practice would not be practical or
effective [14-16,40]. Periodic threats of banning dual
practice also risk destabilizing the public health sector
in places like Uganda, primarily by reducing the supply
of government health workers. The private for-profit
sector allows government providers the additional finan-
cial resources that the Ugandan government is currently
not able to supply. In a relationship of mutual depend-
ency, government providers in dual practice allow for the
growth of the private for-profit sector in the context of
limited health workforce and increasing population
demand.
In the short term, the Ugandan government should
consider the promotion of policies that are flexible to
local adaptions to promote access and quality of services
in the public sector, while at the same time allowing suf-
ficient income for government providers. Informal, local
adaptations to managing dual practice exist in Uganda
and provide a natural experiment for various dual prac-
tice policies. In the long term, the Ugandan government
should consider broader improvements to public sector
management and increasing the resources available to
the health sector, as well as increasing synergies with the
private sector.
Reforms currently under discussion in Uganda include
health insurance and performance-based contracts, both
would change how providers are paid. Such reforms couldpotentially provide an entry point for strengthening public
sector management in general, and therefore provide
health facility managers the tools they are currently
lacking to manage dual practice. As dual practice is un-
likely to disappear in the short term, its existence and
role in the health sector cannot be ignored during the
design and implementation of major health reforms in
Uganda and other countries where dual practice exists.
Potential unintended effects (feedback) should be an-
ticipated based on past events related to dual practice
and dealt with accordingly.
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